Author Archives: Steven Werlin

About Steven Werlin

I moved to Haiti in January 2005. I’ve been writing regular essays since then about the various projects that my colleagues and I work on and about our lives in Haiti.

With Pascal

Pascal has been a case manager for Chemen Lavi Miyò for almost four years. He is one of the original six who were hired to shepherd the 150 women in our pilot through the process. He had been one of Fonkoze’s best credit agents before that. The results of the pilot were striking, with 142 of the 150 families graduating on time. That means, that the women who led those families had accumulated the resources – financial, personal, and social – to support themselves. A remarkable success for women who entered the program with nothing.

Fonkoze spent a lot of time struggling to raise the money needed for the major program scale-up that brought me to CLM. But the work didn’t stop during that interval. We stitched together enough financing to serve 250 members, which was already a big increase. So Pascal and some of the other original case managers just kept working. While most of our team is selecting new members, Pascal and others are well into the eighteen-month cycle with this 250. By early 2011, he will have accompanied his second group of families through this program.

He spends most of his days just visiting the families, moving around enough on foot and on motorcycle to ensure that he sees each of the members he’s responsible for at least once each week. These visits are the heart of the CLM program, because for all the asset transfers and home repair and health interventions and other things we do, unless we accompany our members very closely as they learn to use their new resources to manage their lives, they will fail. Weekly visits allow Pascal to help them keep close track of their businesses’ development, but also to brainstorm with them about the considerable problems they face in their daily lives and to plan.

On the day I went around with him, his first visit was with Gertha. She is a mother of six who’s eleven months into the program. She originally received three goats and 1500 gourds – about $37.50 – worth of merchandise to start a business with. She now has seven goats and a cow to go with about 2100 gourds worth of inventory and cash in her business. She started selling rice and oil, and still does so, but when she sees a chance to buy some fruit, she grabs it because she knows she can turn it over quickly. She also buys a kind of palm leaf that she braids to make sleeping mats. She now supports her family fully with the income from her business, using her livestock only as long-term investment. She and Pascal spoke about an experiment he arranged for one of her older sons, a young man who’s 19.

CLM had provided her the material and the money she would need for minimal home repair. Most of the families who enter our program live in homes that do not protect them from the elements. The roofs leak. The thin walls are cracked. The mud floors ensure an environment that’s bad for everyone’s health. CLM wants its members to live in homes that are shelters, homes that give them a chance to protect both their health and whatever merchandise they have on hand.

When he was helping her plan her home repair, Pascal found Gertha a young carpenter who was willing to take on her son as an apprentice. He worked hard enough that the carpenter was impressed, and now he takes the young man to other jobs. He and his mother are both excited that he is learning a profession that should help him support himself down the road.

Another of member whom Pascal visited that day was Julienne. She also received three goats and 1500 gourds when she started the program. She now has five goats, a cow, a pig, and 3500 gourds in her business. But during his visit, Pascal uncovered a problem: She’s been making a lot of her sales on credit. Of the 3500 gourds in her business, over 1300 are in her customers’ hands. It’s a dangerous situation, because even if they pay her eventually, they are reducing the amount of merchandise she can buy and, so, the amount of money she can make. And she would be able to feed her family if the income drops too low. And that’s a best-case scenario. The customers who owe her money could always fail to pay her at all.

So she and Pascal talked about why she sells on credit and why she probably can’t eliminate the practice entirely. They agreed that she would need to reduce the percentage of her sales that she makes that way. It is the only way to ensure that she keeps moving forward.

Pascal, like all CLM case managers, has only 30 minutes to meet with each member because he must see 50 of them every week. There’s always a lot for him to accomplish in the half-hour. He needs to talk with members about their investments, but also about their health, their children’s education – about all the aspects of their lives that CLM aims to help them improve, which is everything. Using those 30 minutes well might be the key to Pascal’s success

Pascal makes notes about problems CLM members are encountering and the decisions they make to combat them in their notebooks. On subsequent visits, CLM staff will check to the notebooks so that we can be certain we’re following through.

Tit Montayn

Only the last five hours of the hike from the Boukan Kare market to Bouli, the gateway to Tit Montayn, are uphill. You spend the first hour or so crossing and re-crossing the Boukare Kare River. There is nothing like a bridge. You just roll up your pants and do your best to keep your feet as you struggle through the river’s swift, thigh-deep waters. The steep and rocky path that rises after the last crossing – the eighth by my count – is entirely unshaded, so you spend the whole trip under a tropical sun. And reaching the Boukan Kare market is already a challenge, even if there is something like a road that takes you there.

Tit Montayn is, in other words, hard to get to. Neither trucks nor motorcycles can make the trip. There is no road. It is one of Boukan Kare’s four “communal sections.” Boukan Kare itself is a “commune,” something like a county, and a communal section is the next smaller geographical division in Haiti.

Through its Chemen Lavi Miyò program, Fonkoze is committed to removing extreme poverty from Haiti’s Central Plateau, and Boukan Kare is one of the first two counties we entered. But to eliminate extreme poverty from Boukan Kare means eliminating it from all its communal sections, so whatever special challenges a region presents, we know we will have to overcome them. Bringing our program to Tit Montayn will present an array of challenges.

We spent a day last week making a first exploratory visit, hiking up Thursday in time to eat, bathe, and recover. And not much else. Friday morning we walked around a little, talking to community leaders about their section, learning as much as we could in a few hours before we had to head back down the hill.

Tit Montayn is a nickname. The area’s full name in French is Petite Montagne. It is a mountainous region, with steep hills on all sides. From Bouli, the paths stretch out for two to three hours in three directions, toward Ench and Mayisad in the north and east and to the Artibonit River to the west. It’s a lot of territory to cover. We learned that it is sprinkled with little farming communities. There are, perhaps, several hundred of the sort of extremely poor households we will need to work with.

Our case managers can generally serve about 50 households each, so we will surely need to have several of them in Tit Montayn, with a regional director to guide and support their work. There is, of course, no question of their hiking up the mountain every day, so we will have to establish a satellite office with a residence attached. We will have to get equipment up the mountain, but also get people and equipment through and around the hills once they are there. So we will need to acquire some horses and mules. We will need to find ways to ensure communication – cell phone coverage is spotty – and food and water and everything else that staff will need to work full-time in a region far from their homes.

And there’s more. Once we have selected households for the program, we will need to buy them the assets that the program requires. If there are a couple hundred of participating households, and they all choose, say, goat-rearing as one of their enterprises, we will have to get two-three goats into each family’s hands. That’s a lot of goats. Perhaps we’ll be able to buy most of them, or even all of them, in the small markets that we’ll find in the hills, but we cannot be sure of that. And getting large numbers of animals up the hill from Boukan Kare will be a nuisance. Something worth trying to avoid.

And that may not be the worst of it. Our program depends on a certain amount of cash. During the first months after households receive their new assets, we give them a small weekly cash stipend. It’s only 300 gourds, or a little more than $7, but it helps them protect their assets by relieving some of the pressure they normally feel to turn everything they have into cash and consume it right away. After all, their children are hungry. If we find just 200 households in Tit Montayn, that means getting $1400 up the mountain every week, without even considering other expenses.

And the need to transport cash will be multiplied by the fact that we do not implement the program in a vacuum. It works together with Ti Kredi, a credit program for families who are just slightly better off than the ones who qualify for CLM. We will need to be able to deliver loans and collect reimbursements in and around the Tit Montayn hills. And within six months, those Ti Kredi members should be ready to graduate to regular solidarity-group credit, which means larger loans and larger repayments.

All of this means moving around with large amounts of cash in one of the poorest places on earth. Until Brinks comes up with an armored mule, our agents and case managers will need to just throw the money in their backpacks and be as inconspicuous as a stranger in a very isolated region can be. Whatever plans we make for managing our cash will have to be made in close collaboration with the Fonkoze credit staff in the Boukan Kare office, which will be responsible for serving the families of Tit Montayn long after CLM and Ti Kredi have moved on.

So there are a lot of good reasons not to go to Tit Montayn. And there is plenty of need in other, much easier-to-reach places. It is not as though a decision to skip Tit Montayn would have us sitting around, twiddling our thumbs. But we are out to prove that it is possible to eliminate extreme poverty, so we cannot cherry-pick the poverty most convenient for us. Tit Montayn carries an importance for us beyond the families whose lives we hope we’ll permanently and dramatically improve.

Our question cannot be “whether?” but always only “how?”

CLM staff hiking to Tit Montayn

Making Choices

Mirlande is a young mother of five. She lives on a hillside outside of Saut d’Eau. Her home is made of woven strips of wood that are covered with a layer of mud, and a roof of leaves. The house has a dirt floor, and lacks even a very basic latrine. She shares the home with her kids and the man who is father to the four youngest children. The seven of them live on what the father brings in by farming and by buying pigs on credit and selling them quickly at a profit. They don’t have the means to get into the more lucrative business of raising the pigs. That would require the capital both to buy the pigs clear and invest some extra money in feed.

Before Fonkoze can begin to help Haiti’s poorest families lift themselves out of misery, we have to identify those families. Good selection is the cornerstone on which the CLM program is built. It’s a three-step process, and we’re in the middle of it right now.

The first step is Participatory Wealth Ranking (PWR), which I’ve written about before. It’s a process we saw a lot of during our month in Bangladesh. (See: The Right People.) Fonkoze staff members go into the communities we’re planning to work in and hold meetings at which community members provide initial information as to the economic status of each household. Staff members leave these meetings with maps of the communities and lists dividing the households into between four and seven classes, ranging from the richest of the rich – whatever that might mean for a given community – to the poorest of the poor.

The information is useful. It introduces us to a community and teaches us something about how to approach it. We could hardly do without it. But it is neither sufficiently detailed nor 100% reliable. So Fonkoze adds to and verifies it through two more levels of field research on its way to selecting the families who will be invited to participate in CLM.

The first is a set of detailed field surveys completed by the men and women who will eventually serve as case managers for the families we select. Teams of two-three case managers go door-to-door, filling out multiple questionnaires for every family that the PWR meeting has placed in one of the bottom two economic categories. We collect information about the households’ income sources, assets, and their ways of life. These surveys give us extensive baseline data about the families we will eventually work with, and they allow the case managers to make their preliminary recommendations.

Fonkoze has distinct programs for very poor and extremely poor families. They are very different approaches, and it’s important that we get families into the one most appropriate for them. For very poor families we have Ti Kredi, or “Little Credit”. As its name suggests, it is a loan program that provides a more supportive framework than our regular credit programs do so that poorer women can get their businesses onto solid ground. The program lasts six months, includes a supportive repayment calendar and extra education and accompaniment, and prepares participants to move forward through regular solidarity-group credit.

But credit won’t work for the poorest of the poor, because they cannot sustain a business without significant additional support. Their immediate needs would inevitably consume any assets that they might try to invest. Even the very poor are hungry most of the time, but the extremely poor might go for days at a time with nothing substantial to feed their kids. It would be foolish to expect those who live as they do, on the edge of starvation, to set aside resources that could easily be converted into food.

Case managers use the data they collect in these surveys, but also their own good judgment, to confirm that the families they visit truly belong to one of the bottom two groups and to recommend them for either Ti Kredi or CLM. But they only make recommendations. Final selection is made by one of our five field managers. We revisit the homes that our case managers have recommended for CLM to talk with the women who would serve as our program’s link to them, to the women who would participate in the training we offer and take responsibility for the assets we give. We establish how many children the women are responsible for, what other people they have to share their responsibilities with, and how they feed and otherwise care for those who count on them. Our object is to answer a simple question: Could the woman we are talking with succeed in Ti Kredi? Only if we decide that she could not do we select her for CLM.

Most of the judgments are easy. We visit home after home after home with five or six or eight or nine children, all of whom are terribly, visibly hungry. These children might have absentee fathers, or they might have hardworking, but landless ones, who can’t get much more than a dollar for a day’s labor in the field. The families might live from sharecropping, typically receiving two-thirds of what they can scratch out of the fields they farm, enough perhaps to eat a meal a day for a couple of months each year. The women themselves have no small businesses because they have no ability to set aside assets for sale. Many of them labor in the fields next to the men, earning only about 75 cents a day. Some of them just sit at home and rely on their neighbors’ occasional charity, neighbors who are, themselves, far from well off. So when you’ve talked with these women for a few minutes, it’s easy to sign the form that authorizes their participation in CLM.

But then there are cases like Mirlande. She has a working, though volatile partnership with her husband. They do not own the land they live on right now. They rent the house and the land it’s on, which includes a small plot that they farm. This year it cost about $5, up from $3.75 the year before. But they also own two pieces of land, a smaller one her husband inherited from his father, where they are starting to build a house, and a larger one they bought this year when her husband sold a cow. Her three oldest children are in school. The first has his tuition paid by his father, who supports him in no other way, and the other two through a kind of buy-one-get-the-next-two-for-nothing arrangement. They regularly eat about once a day, feeding on the millet and corn that they harvest for as long as that lasts and then on what they can buy through the income of her husband’s pig trade.

I doubt neither Mirlande’s poverty nor her need. I know that she and her family are hungry most of the time. They lead a terribly hard life. But the structure of support that her husband provides, including a regular if inadequate source of income, and the capacity for future planning that their purchase of land demonstrates at least suggest that credit might work for her.

So I went against the case managers’ recommendation and put Mirlande on the list for Ti Kredi. It isn’t the kind of decision one can feel good about because it robs a very poor family of resources that could do its members an awful lot of good. But we need to reserve those limited resources for the families who need them most because, as it stands, there are many more of them in Haiti than we can possibly serve.

It’s Not Easy

Azuba is a young mother of three from a village outside of Mithapukur, a town in northern Bangladesh, one of the poorer parts of the country. Mithapukur is home to a large BRAC office, where BRAC began offering its program for the ultra poor early on, back in 2002. The BRAC team reached Azuba’s village in 2004, and Azuba was selected to participate.

When women enter the program here, they are given a choice among productive assets. BRAC now offers something like nine or ten options, including several different combinations of livestock, a couple of agricultural possibilities, and non-farming commerce. Like many of the women we have met here in Bangladesh, Azuba chose to receive two cows. Cows can take longer than some of the other options to produce income, but they are thought to be reliably profitable. She was given about a week of classroom training, and got her cows shortly afterwards.

Within three months, disaster struck. The two cows very suddenly grew sick. Azuba contacted her caseworker, who notified the branch’s manager for the ultra poor program right away. He rushed to her with a veterinarian, but there was nothing they could do. The cows died.

BRAC’s selection process is designed to involve community members, and there’s a reason for this. BRAC knows that it can’t provide all the material and social support that the ultra poor will need to change their lives. They will need help from their neighbors as well. The BRAC team formalizes this help by organizing community anti-poverty committees shortly after transferring assets to program participants. These committees are made up of the community’s leaders, the very people who might once have supported the poor through offering domestic employment or occasional handouts. Getting them onto a committee takes their habit of charity and applies it towards eliminating the need they are already used to addressing.

So Azuba and the staff of BRAC’s local office made two applications for special support. They appealed both to BRAC’s central office and to the local committee, and both answered the call. A new cow that was pregnant or ready to become pregnant would cost about 8000 Bangladeshi takas. At the current exchange rate, that’s about $112. The BRAC program head authorized 7000 takas to go towards buying Azuba a new cow, and her local committee came up with another 1000. So her caseworker purchased a replacement cow, and Azuba was able to get started again.

Thanks to the second chance that she received, Azuba graduated from the program for the ultra poor. In a sense, she’s begun to flourish. She has a hygienic outhouse and a well that provides safe drinking water. She now has two cows, and one is pregnant. She’s already sold four others. She covers most of her family’s daily expenses with income from a rice business that she started with some of her profit. She and her children live in a house she built with 10,000 takas of her own money, and she farms land that she gained access to by depositing 15,000 takas with its owner.

Azuba is a success story, but also a lesson. Given a chance, poor women can be counted upon to lift their families out of poverty. But it isn’t easy, and those that would help them along that journey must be prepared for bumps in the road.

Choosing the Right People

The BRAC program for the ultra poor begins, just as Fonkoze’s version does, with a careful selection of the women who will be invited to participate. The program is both resource and labor intensive, so you want to make sure that the people you’re serving really need it.

The selection procedure that’s used is called “participatory wealth ranking” (PWR). Just as its name suggests, PWR invites the residents of a community to collectively provide the initial information that will guide eventual selection. PWR involves three staff members: an organizer, a facilitator, and a recorder. And it unfolds in three steps: an initial visit, mapping, and wealth ranking.

The first member of the PWR team, the organizer, undertakes the initial visit. She goes to a village that the BRAC ultra poor team has identified as needing ultra poor services, and she does two things there. She walks around, meeting the community’s members, especially its leaders, and gaining a sense of the number and types of households the village contains. And she invites residents to a meeting to be held the next day. She doesn’t say much about the purpose of the meeting, but just asks them to come because BRAC needs to collect information about the community for a program it hopes to offer.

The next day, all three BRAC staff members come to the village. They will lead the village’s residents through a two-step process. The first step is to trace a map of the community on the ground. They ask for a volunteer from among the participants to help them with this, but work hard to make sure that as many participants as possible are contributing their opinions. This can involve a lot of discussion as to just where to put the roads, and it can take several attempts to get it right. One of the reasons for tracing the map on the ground, rather than directly onto paper, is to make erasure and correction as easy as possible.

After tracing the roads, the volunteer adds symbols to mark important landmarks – schools, Muslim mosques, Hindu temples, government offices – then places small numbered cards everywhere that there is a household.

As each small card is placed, the PWR team is collecting information. They ask the name of the principal member of the household, his or her father’s name, and his or her occupation. This information is gathered by the second member of the PWR team, the facilitator, and written down by the recorder both in a notebook and on larger cards, with each household getting its own card. The notebook will be the official record of the day’s activity, but the cards will be the tools that permit the team to move the group to the next step in the process.

That next step is the actual ranking process, where the team learns the relative economic status of every household in the community. The facilitator will begin by choosing three of the cards and asking participants whether the three households are equally well off. If they are, the facilitator will have to choose another couple of cards and ask the same question. If they are not, the facilitator will ask a volunteer from the community to put them into separate piles. The group will then go through the whole stack of cards, one after another, deciding which pile to put each of them into. In the course of this work, they are likely to come across households that do not exactly fit into any of the piles. For example, they might come across a family much wealthier than any of the initial three. In such cases, they will simply add a new category, or pile. By the activity’s end, they might have five or six or even seven separate piles, each of which represents a distinct level of wealth.

If, at the end of the activity, the facilitator feels that there are too many cards in any one of the piles, he will go through that pile again, asking participants to split the households it contains into two groups. What is most important, at least for the program for the ultra poor, is that all the poorest households in the village end up in one of the bottom two piles, because it is those two piles that BRAC field staff will concentrate on for initial and final verification.

While almost everyone is ranking the households, the team asks another volunteer to copy the map that they have drawn onto paper, so it can form part of the meeting’s permanent record. The map will be filed in the office, and can help BRAC staff, especially supervisory staff, to find members’ households.

The information that’s gained through PWR is not 100% reliable. Program staff will have to follow up with two sets of home visits to gather and verify the detailed information necessary for selecting program participants well. But the PWR is a valuable step in the process nonetheless.

First, it is a valuable starting point. The team collects information that can guide their further work. They don’t have to start from zero. They don’t have to go to every house as they would if they had to start the process with home visits directly.

Second, it helps protect the program from the jealousies it inevitably engenders. A certain few households in the community are being selected to receive substantial support. Having defined people’s level of wealth at a public meeting can make it easier to explain why some people receive support and others don’t.

Finally, it usefully raises the presence of extreme poverty as an issue before the community’s eyes. BRAC will not be able to provide all the support and protection that the ultra poor will need to lift themselves out of poverty. The women who are finally chosen will need their neighbors’ encouragement and support as well. Eventually, BRAC will help the community organize a poverty reduction committee, whose mission will be to provide the extra support and advice that program participants need. In including everyone in the selection process is one way of reminding them that there are terribly poor people in their midst.

Black and White

May 27, 2010, Rangpur, Bangladesh

Nomichha used to work as a servant in her neighbors’ households. They wouldn’t really pay her, but they would give her some food, and between that and the few taka her husband could earn working other people’s land, they would do the best that they could for themselves and their child.

Then BRAC came into their lives.

BRAC is the world’s largest NGO, a comprehensive development agency that was formed in Bangladesh in the wake of independence in the early ‘70s. It now employs over 100,000 people in countries across south Asia and Africa in its broad array of anti-poverty programs. Fonkoze sent three Haitians and me to Bangladesh for a month to study one of those programs – it’s called “Targeting the Ultra Poor” (TUP) – because it is the model for CLM, Fonkoze’s approach to addressing extreme poverty. BRAC will be providing extensive technical assistance as Fonkoze scales-up its program to reach many more families. BRAC is especially known for its capacity to do things not only well, but on a large scale.

BRAC’s TUP team came to Nomichha’s village just over a month ago. They held an open meeting, inviting the local population to help them identify the ultra poor households among them. After verifying what they learned at that meeting, they sent a caseworker to each of the selected households to describe the program to the prospective participant. She would receive training in running an income-generating activity and then be given the assets she would need to get the business started. She would get a daily stipend to buy food for several months. That would enable her to give up working in other households so she could devote herself to her new business. She would also gain free access to essential healthcare services. Most importantly, she would receive weekly visits from her caseworker, who would provide extensive additional training for two years as she built up her new livelihood.

When she heard that BRAC was willing to give her two cows, she was a little afraid. At first she decided not to take them. She had heard rumors that BRAC would force her to convert to Christianity. But her neighbors and family spoke to her, and they convinced her that the rumors weren’t true. So she took the cows, and has been caring for them for a month.

BRAC offers the women served by TUP a wide range of assets to choose from: various sorts of livestock, small plots of land to farm, merchandise to create a small business. But Nomichha can’t really tell you why she chose cows. She’s still very shy. Her neighbors answer most questions for her.

She’ll have a lot to do to graduate in two years: build up her business and her confidence as well. But BRAC gives her a proven road to travel, and dedicated and experienced staff to lead her on her way.

The difference between Nomichha and Mazeda is dramatic. Mazeda is a graduate of the TUP program, having joined it in 2006. She tells a similar story of her life before TUP. She was a domestic servant, doing odd jobs for food in her wealthier neighbors’ homes. “I had a miserable life,” she says, “full of problems.”

BRAC gave her one cow and two goats, and she quickly got her dairy business up and running. She now has two cows and a calf, and is selling two cases of milk per day. She eventually sold the goats because she wanted to invest the money in a rice business instead. “I had learned how to process rice from a neighbor, but I never had the money I needed to start a business myself.” She buys raw rice from farmers and then processes it to be sold in the market. She built her own house with 12,000 takas (about $170) that she earned from her businesses, and leased farmland for 20,000 takas so she can grow some rice herself. She has 3000 takas in savings as well.

BRAC’s program is designed not just to provide extremely poor people with some income, but to fundamentally change their lives, and Mazeda is a great example. “I’m a different person in my village now. People respect me. They come to me for advice, even for small loans.”

We explained to Mazeda why we had come to Bangladesh, and asked her whether she had advice for the Haitian women we would be serving. She asked us to tell them three things, “You need to work hard, listen to the advice your caseworker gives you, and take good care of your assets. Mainly, though, it’s hard work.”

Meeting her, and other TUP graduates, is enormously helpful as we look to make our program in Haiti expand. We don’t have a lot of graduates in Haiti just yet. The pilot of our program served only 150 families. Seeing so many graduates, and hearing their stories, gives you a sense of the scale our program is capable of. It is possible to eliminate extreme poverty for more than a lucky few. One village after another, BRAC is eliminating it from Bangladesh entirely. Though we are not ready to bring the program to such a scale in Haiti, seeing it before one’s eyes gives good reason to hope.

About Poverty

More than 50% 0f Haitians live on less than $1 a day. And one of the most striking things about that fact is that most of the people who make up that roughly 50% are not what Haitians themselves would call “poor”.

It’s not that their lives are easy. Those lives are constantly at risk because of the fragility of the livelihoods that support them. In better times, many such Haitians might manage to eat a good meal once a day, maybe even twice. They might eat enough to stay reasonably healthy much of the time, and to ward off the worst hunger pangs. But it’s hard to have a back-up plan when you’re living on the edge. An illness, an accident, a little bad weather: It doesn’t take much to transform difficult lives into misery.

When I say they are not poor, then, I am, in a sense, playing a game with words. The Creole word “pòv” is generally reserved for those whose state is really wretched. There is another word, “malere” for those who are merely badly off. And most of those living on less that $1 a day are probably malere, not pòv. At least until the next disaster strikes. But the word game has a point. The hard reality is that there are also lots of Haitians, many too many, whose lives are worse than bad.

Fonkoze’s programs, especially its credit programs, are mainly for Haiti’s malere. The malere badly need access to the Fonkoze’s services to improve lives that badly need improvement. But from the moment they enter Fonkoze, they already have the wherewithal to make use of the help Fonkoze can provide. If they are entering directly into standard solidarity group credit, they already have a business that the money they borrow will add to. Even if they are entering into Fonkoze’s Tikredi, or “Little Credit” program, which was designed especially for families that aren’t ready for standard loans just yet, they start with an idea for a business and the determination to succeed.

But Fonkoze knew that it could not be satisfied with itself as long as its reach could extend only to Haiti’s malere. Those whose need for change is greatest are those whom its credit programs could never help. They are the poorest of the poor, the extreme poor, and their lives are difficult to understand or even to conceive.

They are landless, without crops to harvest or businesses to invest in or livestock to sell or consume. They have no income-generating assets at all. They eat what they can, when they can, but neither regularly nor well: a few abandoned mangoes might feed them on one day. They might get to glean a cup of corn in exchange for farm work in a neighbor’s garden on another. They go days at a time without ever having reason to light their fire. Their homes provide no shelter. With every rain that falls, they are sure to get wet. Their children are not in school, and may not be at home either. They may have been sent to live with other families in the hopes that they will at least be fed. What’s worse is that Haiti’s extreme poor live without hope, without imagining that they can change their lives. These households, mostly led by women, are locked in a cycle that starts bad and gets only worse.

Fonkoze’s leadership made a commitment years ago to find a way to serve these especially poor families, so they looked around the world at other institutions that have discovered approaches that work.

They founded what they were looking for in Bangladesh. An organization named BRAC had developed an approach that depends on teaching people to manage an income-generating activity and then giving them the assets they need to start their own. It’s a two-year process that depends on very close accompaniment. Program participants get visits once or twice a week from case managers who provide coaching and encouragement.

Fonkoze piloted the program in Haiti for 150 families with BRAC’s help. We call the program CLM, short for “Chemen Lavi Miyò,” or “the Pathway to a Better Life.” Results were excellent. 142 of the families were self-supporting within two years. The pilot demonstrated that, even in as difficult and dysfunctional an environment as Haiti, allowing families to suffer such misery is a choice. We can do something about it. They live that way because we are not sufficiently committed to change.

Fonkoze is now ready to dramatically expand the program. It has hired four new field managers to work beside the one already in place, and is preparing 20 new case managers. We will begin serving 1000 new families right away.

I will be one of those field managers. I left the Marigo branch on Saturday, and on Sunday flew to New York. Monday my three Haitian colleagues and I got visas from the Bangladeshi consulate, and are now on our way for a month’s training with BRAC in Bangladesh. I have seen CLM a number of times over the past couple of years, usually as a translator for Fonkoze’s visitors. I look forward to developing a team of case managers who can succeed at this most important work.

But the stakes are troublingly high. In Marigo, our team was working with women many of whom were just a hair’s breadth from misery. An error or an accident could have brought them to disaster at any time. The women in CLM, however, are already suffering the worst sort of misery. CLM is very simply a matter of life and death. I will owe it to them to keep their danger constantly in mind.

Rebuilding in Nan Kajou

One of the last of the Marigo credit centers I got to know was the one in Nan Kajou. Most of the centers we serve are much farther from the office than it is, but few are as hard to reach. A motorcycle can only get you within a 90-minute hike, and that hike involves crossing one branch of the main river that divides Marigo from Peredo to the east at least seven times. In the dry season, you can skip across most of the crossings, jumping from one rock to another. At other times of the year, you wade in swiftly flowing water that’s anything from ankle- to waist-deep.

None of that, however, would have kept me from getting to the center early on. When I arrived last March, I made the least accessible centers my highest priority, if only to show the credit agents I supervise that I was ready to go wherever our work takes us. The problem is that we go to Nan Kajou on Monday mornings, and as long as I was struggling to get home to Kaglo every weekend, I could never get back to Marigo on time. Since the earthquake, however, I’ve been spending my weekends here, so I’ve been there more than once.

The center has an interesting history. It was opened a short distance from an older center that was failing. The original center’s members either dropped out of our credit program or simply stopped paying. A few of the borrowers who remained agreed to walk a little farther up the mountain, away from the river, to the center’s current location, where there were several women who wanted to join Fonkoze.

It flourished. On March 1st 2008, it had six groups with 26 members. They had credit worth 173,000 gourds, and the delinquency rate was, precisely, zero. Not a gourd was late.

By a year later, the picture had changed quite a bit. Haiti, and the area along the river that passes near Nan Kajou in particular, had been wrecked by the successive tropical storms that struck in the fall of 2008. Fonkoze had managed, by December, to eliminate the interest due on the debt the women in places like Nan Kajou were carrying and to get them new interest-free loans as well. The portfolio there thus grew substantially. The women had loans worth over 275,000 gourds, but their delinquency rate was still less than 1%.

On March 1st of this year, the delinquency rate there was back to zero, but that says very little about the state of the center. Four women there currently have Fonkoze loans totaling 35,000 gourds. What happened?

To begin an answer, we should look at the data from September 2009, halfway between March of last year and March of this. By September 1st 2009, we had 12 loans in the center. That’s not because we had found new borrowers. It’s because the borrowers we had were struggling to repay their hurricane loans at different speeds. The center’s solidarity groups started to splinter as some group members finished with their hurricane loans and returned to regular interest-bearing ones while others struggled to repay their hurricane loans. The center’s delinquency rate had increased to almost 36%.

The delinquency was almost equally divided between hurricane loans and normal loans. The delinquent normal loans belonged to members who had refused the interest-free loans and elected to remain in normal credit. This they had done because they had finished paying their last loans before the hurricane. They had no balances they needed to face. By choosing the regular program, they could get larger loans and an extra month before their first repayment. It didn’t work, as their inability to repay the loans shows.

The delinquent hurricane loans simply reflected the difficulty of the position the women were in. Their businesses were still alive, but had been reduced because they had been worth more than the capital the women borrowed from Fonkoze. Their other sources of income had been hit as well. They wer forced to do more with less, and it wasn’t easy.

Despite the women’s best efforts, we wrote off the remaining balances on seven loans, about 43,000 gourds. From late 2009 through January of this year, the center seemed to be dying. Though reimbursements continued to trickle in, fewer and fewer women were coming to meetings. We needed a fuller sense of what was going so terribly wrong.

So I went to the center and started talking to women. The first thing I needed to know was why so many of them were leaving credit. Despite the write-offs, they were continuing to repay their loans, but when they successfully repaid their hurricane loans, they were deciding not to take new ones. This was surprising to us, because we had assumed that it was the opportunity to get new credit that was motivating borrowers to repay these loans.

Almost none of the borrowers in Nan Kajou have their businesses there. There’s just not enough population. Most of them sell produce in Jakmèl and Port au Prince. And though they live in a productive agricultural region, they do not buy their produce near home. They would have no way of getting large amounts of local produce to market. They don’t have enough pack animals, and motorized vehicles can’t get anywhere near where they live. So the women hike down to the market in Peredo on Tuesday mornings, make their purchases there, and then take them to the cities on Wednesday.

When the storms swept through in 2008, their newly purchased merchandise was waiting in storage in Peredo. Everything that floodwaters left them rotted where it was because transportation was cut off. It was a total loss. They took the hurricane loans because they didn’t want to be in debt, but twelve months of paying them back ate into the businesses the loans were intended to restore. By the end of the year, the women were finding it harder to make a profit. So they decided to finish paying off their debt and shut down their businesses. They stopped coming to the center because they didn’t intend to continue with us.

That began to change when we let those whom we had written off know that we would give them another chance as soon as they finished repaying what they owed. Normally, getting yourself written off makes you ineligible for future loans, but Fonkoze has taken the position that hurricane loans are a special case. We recognize that these loans, though they seemed like a sensible way to help women make their own way out of debt and have worked reasonably well for the vast majority of borrowers who received them, have been anything but easy.

Then there was the earthquake. It burdened the women with new expenses that they have to meet. Their homes need repair. They and their loved ones lost clothes, furniture, and other necessities they must replace. The exodus out of Port au Prince and Jakmèl left them with more mouths to feed.

And it made business more difficult as well. The declining city populations have hurt sales, as has the distribution of food aid. Prices of local produce in market towns like Peredo have increased as increased local demand has decreased the amount available for sale. It will be harder and harder for them to make a profit.

But yesterday at a center with only four active borrowers we met with over twenty women. The women want to return to credit. They feel they have no choice. They cannot afford to sit a home. So we are preparing to give them credit again. The first eleven of them will get theirs later this month. More will get loans in April. By May we could by back up to 25 members again.

But we’ll have to offer more than loans. We will have figure out ways to support them as they struggle in an environment that’s more difficult and less predictable than it’s ever been. Their desire to return to credit is a great sign for the Marigo branch. It’s one indication that things here really are turning around. But unless we can help women like those in Nan Kajou succeed, our efforts to turn around this struggling branch won’t mean very much.

Moving Forward Again

Thursday, I got word from Kaglo, the small village in the mountains above Port au Prince that has been my home in Haiti since 1997. There are now about 25 people sleeping in my house there every night. Mine is one of the few houses in the neighborhood with a tin roof, and neighbors who have roofs of poured concrete – which was, until recently, the more prestigious way to build – are afraid to sleep in their own homes. There would be another couple of people there, but two teenagers, recognizing that they will have no school for the present, decided to join me in Marigo and are now staying with me here.

There’s nothing exceptional about my house’s state. Fonkoze offices all over Haiti are getting reports of rural households filling up with a combination of refugees from Port au Prince and neighbors whose homes were too badly damaged to trust. My own house presents a very manageable instance. Each of the various households whose members sleep there still cook their own meals and manage the rest of their own expenses as well. They come together only to sleep.

Other cases are more challenging. Families in the countryside, for example, might find themselves hosting grown children or siblings or cousins and their families from Port au Prince, any number of people who no longer have any means of their own. Their jobs no longer exist. The small commerce they managed in the city disappeared with their homes and most of their other belongings. They may have lost a couple of family members as well. The combination of farming, animal husbandry, and small commerce that was, until now, supporting a household of three or four or five, may now have to support twice or three times that many. I spoke to a notoriously successful credit agent from Fonkoze’s model branch in Lenbe, and he told me about a client of his whose two-room house once had three residents and now has 25. And the commerce his client manages with her Fonkoze loan has to support them all.

But there is a flip side to this emigration from Port au Prince to other parts of the country. The level of economic activity in those other areas has noticeably increased. We began to see it in the expansion of the smaller daily markets in the mountains above Marigo. Little turns in the road where we were accustomed to seeing a three or four women sitting with their wares in baskets in front of them now have a dozen or twenty women or even more. They are starting to look like markets. And the major regional markets seem to be growing dramatically too. The three closest to Marigo – Savann Dibwa, Peredo, and Kay Jakmèl – all seem much busier. More people are there, both buying and selling.

It’s been a boon to Fonkoze in Marigo and to the women it serves. At least those who have merchadise that escaped the earthquake or money to buy with. That’s been most evident in loan reimbursements. In the days when we first opened after the disaster, we collected very little of the money that was owed. Attendance at credit centers was unusually poor, and those who came told us, for the most part, that they would not be able to pay. In the first week we collected less than 25% of what was due. But in the last two weeks the ship has showed real signs that it is righting itself. If you don’t count money that was already past due, we’ve been able to collect about 90% of what we’d expect. That is much too low, substantially lower than the worldwide norm for microfinance and too low to get us to where we are sustainable, but it shows that the rapid and dangerous deterioration of our portfolio that we feared is not happening. At least not yet.

This is not to say that we have nothing to worry about. Our members were hit hard by the earthquake. They lost their homes, their businesses, their families and their friends. So Fonkoze will need to figure out how to help them get back on their feet for two reasons. On one hand, our own survival depends largely on our ability to help its members prosper. More importantly, since we exist only to help them make their way out of poverty we cannot be what we claim to be unless those members succeed.

As a step towards sorting things out, we invited almost 20 of our borrowers to a half-day meeting in Marigo. We wanted to hear from them. We chose women we view as leaders in their centers. Most, but not all, were their center’s elected chief. We felt that it was important to be dealing with women in some of the most affected communities, women whom we knew, from experience, we could count on to be clear and direct about what they had to say. We were, and still are, in a delicate position. We know that we want to take extraordinary steps to help our borrowers in this time of need. We also know, however, that we can’t yet say what we’ll be able to do. Talking too much with our borrowers about their needs could easily raise their expectations and lead to disappointment if we are not careful. We wanted to be sure that we were dealing with women with whom we feel we communicate especially well. The credit agents and I came up with a list of names, and our branch’s full-time field evaluator – called a “social impact monitor” – took care of the rest. By 9:30 in the morning, our discussions had begun.

The meeting proceeded in two stages. We started by splitting the women into two groups of manageable size to hold focus-group discussions of the earthquake and its consequences. We were speaking with women who were both victims and advocates for victims, and they spoke strikingly in both senses.

There were lots of tears, both happy and not. Madeleine is a long time Fonkoze member from downtown Marigo itself. She had two children living in Port au Prince at the time of the quake. She wept as she told about finally hearing news of them two days after the distaster. For those two days she had had no word. She had no reason to think that they were alive. Eliamène told us about how she lifted her child in one hand as the kitchen they were in collapsed around them, and then ran to her aged mother, who was sleeping in a back room, and lifted her with the other. She herself couldn’t explain where she got the strength. Then she went on to explain how her mother died just a few days later. The shock of it all, she cried, had been just too much.

They spoke in detail about the losses that they and their fellow members had suffered. Many had homes that were either damaged or destroyed. Many lost livestock. Women in one area spoke of rainwater cisterns they depend upon for drinking water that had cracked and now leak. And very many of them lost all or part of their businesses, in any number of ways. Some lost produce that rotted before it could get to market. Others lost merchandise in houses or depots that collapsed. Still others lost their merchandise because they panicked and ran when the quake struck. A young member from Mabriyòl was in Port au Prince with a shipment of beans and coffee. In the hours after the quake struck, she dumped them at a heavy loss just to be rid of them. She felt lucky to be alive. The church full of friends whom she was to meet after selling her wares were not as lucky.

After about 90 minutes of sharing, I gave the women a report. I told them first about the state of Fonkoze. Fonkoze is a membership organization. Its majority owners are its member/borrowers, and I like to emphasize that point every chance I get. They needed to know the state of their institution, if for no other reason than because it is theirs. I told them about the organization as a whole and about the Marigo office as well.

I then presented a summary of the information that our credit agents have been collecting in their visits to the centers. We have reliable data concerning over half of the women who have loans with Fonkoze Marigo, and the picture is grim. 20% of them have lost their homes, and another 67% have homes that were damaged. The vagueness of the difference between “home destroyed” and “home damaged” probably means that the percentage who’ve lost their homes entirely is really a good deal higher. More than 36% of the women lost cash or merchandise, some everything, though some less than that. Many lost family members, and a few lost children. And many lost assorted other things, like livestock, trees, or rainwater cisterns. This latter problem especially struck the dry regions in the mountains above Belans, and is especially dangerous. There’s not much in the way of spring- or well-water up there, so securing something to drink will be a problem for awhile.

They asked a few clarifying questions, but were then ready to give us advice. The first one to speak was Marie Ange, a very strong center chief from the large town of Kay Jakmèl. She suggested that Fonkoze should lend them the money they need to rebuild their homes. But Yemitsou, a young center chief from the rich farming region between Peredo and the sea answered that such loans wouldn’t work because no one would be able to pay them back. She said that if Fonkoze wanted to help them with their homes, it would probably require gifts, even if that meant that the amount was much less.

Eliamène then jumped in. She buys charcoal from smaller merchants she knows in the countryside and then sells it to wholesalers, who take it for sale in Port au Prince. She sells to them on credit. She’s had great relations with them. The system has worked well. They pay her when they return from Port au Prince. Unfortunately, this time they never made it back from Port au Prince. They died before they could pay her what she was owed. She lost everything. She didn’t think that Fonkoze could do much to help her rebuild her home. That will, she said, be a long and expensive process. But if it could help her manage her current debt, and give her an additional grant to reinvest in her lost business, she would be able to solve her housing problem herself, at least eventually. After all, she explained, she had already managed to build a home once.

We will have to give their various suggestions careful thought. They understand, I think, that part of the equation will involve our figuring out what we are actually able to do. But it is a remarkable fact, though common enough in Haiti these days, that as worried and shell-shocked and unhappy as these women were, none showed any signs of hopelessness. Though several warned me that their members would not be able to sustain the 90% repayment rate I reported to them for long, they all agreed that they are ready to move forward. They are hopeful that Fonkoze will be able to give them the kind of extra help they have learned to depend upon, but understand that, in the final analysis, they will have to, and will be able to, count on themselves.

Tonton Palmis

The Haitian five-gourd coin has the national logo, with its cluster of palm trees, on one side. On the other, it has images of the five fathers of the Haitian revolution, which led to independence in 1804. Children play a gambling game that involves flipping a coin and calling “tonton” or “palmis”, which is to say “uncles” or “palm trees”. It’s the Haitian equivalent of “heads or tails”.

It’s also a convenient image for the two sides of an issue, an image that’s been on my mind a lot these days. Since the earthquake, I am especially aware of the two sides of microfinance, as opposed to microcredit. Microfinance includes the microcredit that the worldwide movement is most known for. But it also involves making a range of other financial services available to the poor.

Wednesday I was at the market in Kajak working on the credit side of the equation.

Kajak might be the highest market town in Haiti. It’s just below Pic Cabaio, one of Haiti’s highest mountains, on the edge of a pine forest. It sits at the entrance of the path that leads from ridge overlooking the southeast coast, through the hills, to the large market in Kenskof, above Port au Prince. Though the path is almost impassible for motorized vehicles most of the time, it bears heavy pedestrian traffic. Market women from the fertile region around and beneath Segen load produce – potatoes, beets, onions, leeks, carrots, whatever the season brings – onto their heads or their animals and bring it for sale in Kenskof and Pétion-Ville.

Fonkoze’s Marigo office has a long, unhappy history in Kajak. We once served so many borrowers in the region that we had to divide them into two credit centers. They were the largest and second-largest centers we managed. Though we had over forty other centers throughout three large counties, Kajak was home to over 10% of our portfolio. But that portfolio collapsed for a number of reasons, centered on a credit agent’s poor work and the dishonesty of a man named Dickenson, who was permitted to have a role in the center that he never should have had.

Effective microcredit depends on the close relationships that the staff of an institution like Fonkoze develops with the institution’s borrowers, but in Kajak those relationships were mediated by Dickenson, who was always closer to our members than we were. Rather than doing the hard work involved in recruiting new Fonkoze members, or leaving that recruitment in the hands of women who are members already, the center’s former agent just had Dickenson hand him lists of women whom he would then add to his portfolio.

Dickenson used a combination of his relative closeness to the women and the appearance of a close relationship with Fonkoze to profit handsomely at the great expense of both the borrowers and of Fonkoze. On the one hand, he would charge women for introducing them to Fonkoze and demand a fee from them for every credit they received. On the other, he collected some reimbursement payments at a time when hurricane damage made it difficult for Fonkoze’s credit agent to get to the area, and then he kept those payments. The women were left thinking they had repaid Fonkoze when, in fact, they had only paid him.

For the past couple of months, some of the former members of the Kajak center had been visiting the center closest to them – a very high-functioning little one in a place called Granfon – and politely but firmly pressuring its credit agent, who goes by “Bob”, to accept them into it. At first, I was pleased by the development. The one problem with the center in Granfon is that it has too few members. Though its members have finally recruited a third five-women group, it has been functioning with only ten women since I arrived in Marigo. I imagined the introduction of two or three solidarity groups from Kajak as a quick and easy way to expand the center.

I realized, however, that inserting them into the center would be creating a of trap for Fonkoze that the history of that same Granfon center can help illustrate. That center was established when three groups, who were already members of a center in a place called Kasedan, decided to pull out of the Kasedan center because it was functioning poorly. They didn’t want to be held responsible for the center’s other groups. They felt no commitment to the other women, nor did they trust them to right their ship. As it turns out, they were correct. The Kasedan center collapsed even before I got to Marigo.

What’s worse, of the three groups that originally pulled out of that center to form the one in Granfon, two of them were from Granfon itself and one group of only three women was from an area on the other side of the same ridge. The ten women in the two Granfon groups didn’t know these other women very well, and that third group has been a constant source of problems.

Though the members of the two Granfon groups sometimes have problems too, they have consistently shown their readiness to help one another out. I sat with them one day as the nine who were present at a reimbursement pitched to make a repayment for the tenth who was only her way from Port au Prince. They had assembled all the money so that the center’s payment would be complete when she arrived out of breath from her five-hour hike, with a smile on her face and her own payment in hand. They have been unwilling, however, to do anything for this third group, just as they were unwilling to do anything for the other members of the center in Kasedan.

The lesson is that members need to have control over their center’s membership. We cannot expect them to stand by one another unless they can choose their own team. Inserting the women from Kajak into the Granfon center would be asking for trouble.

So I offered them an alternative: Fonkoze would try to open a new center for them in Kajak if they could recruit at least four solidarity groups to start with. The center would eventually need to be larger than that. We would not be able to justify the distance for twenty women. But with twenty we could start. We know from our albeit-unsuccessful first experience there that the demand for credit in Kajak is great.

These four groups could include both new members of Fonkoze and members of the old Kajak centers who do not owe Fonkoze money. The women themselves would do the recruiting. Both new and old members would then go through the training in Fonkoze credit that we offer to all new members. Bob would spend a couple of days in Kajak, visiting them in their markets and their homes, getting to know them. He’s been very good over the last several months at building relationships with the members he serves and has this been able to bring a couple of large moribund centers back to life. Kajak would be a new an different challenge, but he seems anxious to undertake it.

Wednesday was our first meeting with them in Kajak. We all sat shivering in the breezy mountain air in a stone house that had lost one of its walls to the recent quake. Bob and I met with 25 women, ten of them new to Fonkoze. We spoke at length about credit and the other services we offer. They talked to us about their need. Most of them depend on the same core business. They buy produce in the mountains and bring it to market in , Kenskof, Pétion-Ville, and Port au Prince, and they need more money to buy more produce to make their trips back and forth more profitable. They are, I think, exactly the sort of women whom Fonkoze was created to serve. A few were young women, formerly sent by the families to school in Pétion-Ville, now returned home because the earthquake destroyed their schools. Most, however, were older women who had to “sign” the forms with which they opened their new savings accounts with a thumbprint and an “x”. We are going to want to get educational programs to them as quickly as we can.

We won’t want to rush the process as we open this center. Shortcuts are what got us into trouble here in the first place. But we are optimistic. We were brought back to Kajak by the insistent initiative of the very women who want us there. Our credit agent is, unfortunately, a man, but the movement is being driven by the women it means to serve. No Dickenson. No other local male leader either.

So credit remains one important side of microfinance, but other financial services, what Fonkoze usually lumps together and calls “operations”, present an important flip side. These include savings accounts and microinsurance, but since the earthquake remittances have taken center stage.

Fonkoze entered into the remittance business because it recognized the central role that Haitians abroad will have to play in their country’s development. Fonkoze’s original mission, to democratize the Haitian economy, would not be able to succeed as long as its citizens lack the resources to participate in their nation’, their own community’s, development. By facilitating transfers from friends and family members abroad to the rural Haitians who need them, Fonkoze branches enable otherwise isolated communities to accumulate what they need to take their own steps forward.

These remittances are an important part of the Haitian economy at any time. Estimates vary, but they account for a substantial percentage of the money here in any case. But the earthquake left Haitian families in the States scrambling to send what they can to survivors, and left those survivors scrambling to find financial institutions open and ready to serve them.

The commercial banks are still not fully operational. Unibank is perhaps the largest. It’s the one Fonkoze itself uses. Its office in Jacmel is still closed almost three weeks after the quake.

Fonkoze’s own office in Jacmel, a city that was hit almost as hard as Port au Prince, was decimated. But it has been up and running in a new building, though without any materials, for more than a week. Fonkoze’s office in Port au Prince has been paying hundreds of remittances every day. Much of our central office staff have turned themselves into makeshift tellers so that they can serve as many people as possible.

We have been helped considerably by the way our branches are scattered throughout the country. Paying remittances requires internet service, but long before it was restored to the branches that were hardest hit, Fonkoze was able to serve its customers by telephoning branches that continued to have good connections. A branch like ours, in Marigo, was doing double duty, paying not just its own clients but those of other branches as well. We in Marigo are still paying most of the remittances for the branch in Jacmel.

Here, some data might help. The first weeks of the year are usually a slow time for remittances. Haitian Americans like to send something to Haiti in December to help their families celebrate Christmas and January 1st, which is Haitian Independence Day. Our Fonkoze office offers remittances through several different companies, and in the third week of January 2009, for example, we paid one dollar-denominated remittance for one company and none for a second. This year, the week of January 18th saw us pay 21 for one company and 14 for the other. That was while we were forced to change all remittances into gourds. We received a shipment of dollars on Saturday, January 23, and in the three days that followed we paid out 36 remittances for one service and 41 for the other. None of this increase includes the remittances we were paying for Port au Prince and Jacmel.

Thanks to the extraordinary efforts of our central office and its friends in Port au Prince, Washington, and New York, liquidity has not been a problem for us for over a week. We have never had the level of activity we’ve had for the past two weeks, but our cash reserves have held. Although in the first days after the earthquake, we had to ask a couple of customers to make smaller withdrawals than they planned – I thought of Jimmy Stewart in “It’s a Wonderful Life” – and though we spent a week paying all remittances in gourds because we didn’t have dollars, we never had to turn anyone away. Our biggest, our only, priority has been to get money into the hands of people who need it, and at this we have succeeded without qualification.

And getting cash to our customers is important. And not only because, like Jimmy Stewart’s bank, Fonkoze needs to be there for them for the long term. Our customers need the money that’s sent to them, right now more than ever. There are many indications of its importance, but none is perhaps more telling than the difficulties they are willing to endure to receive even small sums. We have been paying remittances as small as $20 for our Port au Prince office. That might not be a lot, but it’s enough to drive someone to wait in line for half a day, in the hot tropical sun.

Right now, they are not using the money to pay school tuition or to buy the presents for their kids they tend to buy with the transfers that annually arrive as Christmas approaches. They may have no other way to access to money they need to feed themselves and their families every day.

So microfinance is, more than ever, showing its two sides. But those two sides are connected by a common substance, just as the two sides of a coin are equally connected to the metal the coin is made of. Everything we do aims to get resources, money, into the hands of people who would otherwise have no easy access to them. Once they have money in their hands to work with, their own intelligence and energy combine with educational programs that we also provide to give them their most likely route out of poverty.